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ETHICAL NATURALISM AND EVIL 
David O'Connor 
Recently in this journal Mark T. Nelson argued that theists do not have to 
concern themselves with defending theism against the argument from evil. 
He based this on a claim that, in virtually all cases, no non-relativized for-
mulation of the argument from evil is possible. Against this, I argue for his 
being wrong on both points and for a formulation of the argument from evil 
that is more adequate than that used in his paper-this being a formulation 
that is neither relativized nor one against which theism is justifiably excused 
from the need to defend itself. 
In a recent article in this journaJ! Mark T. Nelson argues that an essential 
feature of a large class of atheistic arguments from evil to the non-existence 
of God, namely, their ethical naturalism, justifies theists in not taking those 
arguments seriously. But, as I will show, Nelson's argument fails and the 
philosophical problem of evil is one that theists2 do indeed have to reckon 
with. 
The atheistic arguments that Nelson is interested in are tied to philosophical 
naturalism and, more specifically, to ethical naturalism. This does not restrict 
the scope of his claim, however, for, as a practical matter, such arguments 
represent virtually the whole class of atheistic arguments from evil. As he 
describes it, ethical naturalism is typically inclined either to relativism, sub-
jectivism, or nihilism.3 Because it does not matter for my argument whether 
atheists who argue from evil to the non-existence of God are ethical rela-
tivists, subjectivists, or nihilists, I shall speak from now on only of such 
philosophers' relativistic readings of ethical propositions, with the under-
standing that either or both of the alternatives may be substituted without 
affecting my argument. 
In essence Nelson's position is the following: the crucial propositions in 
the atheist's case are 
(1) if there were an all-good, all-powerful God, then there would be little 
or no evil in the world, 
because 
(4) if there were an all-good God, he would want there to be little or no evil 
in the world, 
and an omnipotent, omniscient, all-good God would be able to bring about a 
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world in which there was little or no evil.4 But propositions (1) and (4) are 
moral propositions.s So, as they are believed true by atheists whose concep-
tion of morality is relativistic, they are relativistic propositions. Arguably it 
is code-relativism that, as formulated by Gilbert Harman, is the strongest 
version of moral relativism, so, consistent with that and wishing to take the 
argument from evil on its strongest terms, (4) should be read to mean 
(4*) if there were a God who was all-good according to code C, he would 
want there to be little or no evil in the world.6 
But this 
... simply reflects (presumably) the speaker's code. Yet, code C is not neces-
sarily the same as the theist's code (let alone God's); moreover, if this is so, 
there need be no code-independent reason for the theist (or God) to hold code 
C. So, if code C is not the theist's code, then the conclusion of the argument 
from evil is of little concern to the theist. 7 
Thus, Nelson believes, it is not incumbent upon theists to defend their theory 
against the argument from evil. 
Let us look closely at Nelson's argument and in particular at proposition 
(4). In agreement with Nelson,8 I do not think that anything significant in the 
present context turns upon the difference between (1) and (4), so I shall ignore 
(1). Nelson treats (4) as basic to atheism's case, and in fact his own argument 
requires its being basic, but it is not basic at all, thus his interpretation of (4) 
as (4*) does not compromise atheism's argument from evil or immunize 
theism against it. I will show these things by showing that the problem of 
evil lies deeper both than Nelson seems to think and than his analysis reaches, 
and also that it possesses greater subtlety and power than he recognizes. 
Instead of being itself basic, (4) is one particular interpretation and appli-
cation of another proposition that is basic. That proposition is 
(*4) if God, as defined in traditional theism, exists, he would not want there 
to be unjustified evil in the world, i.e. any evil which, from God's point 
of view, had no morally sufficient reason for existing.9 
Proposition (*4) does not commit atheism to the view that there can be "little 
or no Uustified) evil" in a God-made world, and so allows atheistic thinking 
on God and evil to be seen as more subtle and nuanced than does (4). This 
is because (*4) countenances atheists' accepting the possibility that some 
types and tokens of evil are indeed compatible with the existence of God 
while, at the same time, pressing the point that not all the evil that actually 
exists is justified in a supposedly God-made world. Richard Swinburne ac-
knowledges this point as the focus of the especially "awkward" (for theists, 
that is) formulation of the problem of evil. lO To be sure, some atheists do 
believe that the net amount of justified evil in any God-made world is none 
or virtually none, but so strict an interpretation of (*4) is optional. Thus, this 
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interpretation does not serve to provide an adequate characterization of athe-
istic thinking on the problem of evil, or its strongest formulation. 
In the literature such reasons as the following are frequently cited as mor-
ally sufficient for the existence of either any or all evil in a God-made world: 
the freedom of choice and action possessed by human beings and deemed 
necessary by God for the success of his plan for human moral development; 
the need for there to be natural evil in the world so that, from experience of 
it, human beings can learn about the harmful consequences of some of their 
actions. The former is standardly offered as justification for moral evil in a 
God-made world while the latter is offered as justifying natural evil. 
For brevity, let us agree to read "evil" in propositions (1), (4) and (*4) as 
meaning only natural evil, thereby restricting ourselves to the problem of 
natural evil. That being so means we should take (4) to be a particular 
interpretation and application of 
(**4) if God, as defined in traditional theism, exists, he would not want 
there to be unjustified natural evil in the world, i.e. any natural evil 
which, from God's point of view, had no morally sufficient reason 
for existing, 
and interpretations and applications other than (4) are possible and plausible. 
Thus it is not incumbent upon atheists to endorse (4). Nelson's claim about 
proposition (4) is that it is optional for theists. I agree. In short, then, the 
acceptance of proposition (4) is optional all around. But the same does not 
apply to either (*4) or (**4), for they, being implicates of the traditional 
theistic definition of "God," are true if that definition is true. The gist of the 
definition is that by "God" is meant an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly 
good being who made the world, conserves it in existence, and wants all 
human beings freely to choose and achieve their own destiny. Specifically, 
propositions (*4) and (**4) are entailed by the goodness clause in that defi-
nition. For it is simply inconsistent with something's being perfectly good 
either that he would want there to be in the world natural evils for which 
there is no morally sufficient reason or that the existence of such natural evils 
would ever be a matter of indifference to him. Thus, both theists and atheists 
will accept that (**4) is true. In other words, (**4) is a code-independent 
proposition insofar as theism and atheism are concerned. 
Furthermore, theists, believing that God does in fact exist, will also believe 
that there exists no natural evil for which there is no morally sufficient reason, 
while their atheistic opponents will argue that certain classes or instances of 
natural evil are gratuitous. Clearly, we cannot here get into the question of 
whether or not there are any such cases of gratuitous natural evil, nor need 
we. Given the status of (* *4), to warrant a response from theists an atheist 
(or anybody else, for that matter) must only show that, prima/acie, there are 
such cases. And ordinary everyday experience does seem to give us an abun-
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dance of them; to cite just one class of examples, the many instances of what 
seems to be biologically useless pain among both animals and humans. Thus, 
it is the combination of 
(a) (**4)'s being true, 
(b) (**4)'s being basic in both theism and all formulations of the argument 
from (natural) evil,!! 
and 
(c) the existence in the world of either types or tokens of prima facie 
gratuitous natural evil 
that constitutes the core of the problem of (natural) evil, that shows it to lie 
deeper than Nelson digs, and that makes it a problem that theists cannot duck 
for such reasons as those he offers. 
A separate, although related, issue: Nelson maintains that, as standardly 
deployed, the argument from evil is an ad hominem argument against theists. 12 
There is a weak sense in which this is true, but on balance it is a misleading 
way of describing the argument. For, to describe it as ad hominem suggests 
that, because the argument from evil is directed specifically against theists, 
attention is thereby being deflected from a matter of substance to some merely 
local features of a given theist's, or class of theists', formulation of theism. 
But that is misleading, for the problem of evil-understood essentially as the 
seeming discordance between either (*4) or (**4) and the existence of prima 
facie gratuitous evil-only arises in the first place on the supposition that 
God, as traditionally defined in standard theism, exists and made the world. 
Hence there is no way of formulating the problem that does not call either 
the truth of theism or the reasonableness of believing it true into question. 
Seton Hall University 
NOTES 
1. Mark T. Nelson, "Naturalistic Ethics and The Argument from Evil," Faith and 
Philosophy, Vol. 8, No.3 (July 1991), pp. 368-79. 
2. Two points of clarification: first, a distinction must be made between theists and 
religious believers (even believers in the God oftraditional theism). The former are holders 
of a certain philosophical theory, whose central theses I will state later on in this paper, 
while the latter need make no overt theoretical commitments whatever; second, a distinc-
tion must be made between the philosophical problem(s) of evil-the logical and the 
evidential problems basically-and various personal and pastoral problems of evil. The 
former are problems that arise on and for a certain philosophical theory and thereby that 
call for solution in reasoning and argument, while the latter do neither. 
3. Ibid., p. 368. 
4. Ibid., pp. 369-70. For convenience, I have retained Nelson's numbering of the 
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propositions that are under discussion in both his paper and mine, namely, (I), (4), and 
(4*). 
5. Ibid., pp. 370-71 and fn. 4, p. 377. 
6. Ibid., p. 375. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., p. 376. 
9. See my "On the Problem of Evil's not Being what it Seems," The Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 149 (October 1987), p. 442. 
10. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979), p. 219. 
11. On page 376 Nelson maintains, 
In sum, it's not as if the naturalist can point to a definite set of moral 
propositions which all theists must share and say, "See! These commit you 
to (4)." 
For the sake of argument, let us suppose that (*4) and (**4) constitute such a definite 
set. Even if that were so, nobody who accepted those propositions would be committed 
to (4), for it is not entailed by them. Rather, as I remarked earlier, it is a particular 
interpretation of one or both of them. But, as I have been arguing, there is no significantly 
good news for theism in its not being committed to (4), for atheists are not committed to 
it as part of the ground floor of the argument from evil either. 
12. Nelson, op. cit., p. 376. 
